Philosophical Gladiators: A Discussion So Deep It Will Make Your Brain Drip Out Your Ears

Anon writes the following in response to my post What Science Can Never Explain: Why We Subjectively Experience Our Lives

Hi Jake. I think we may be talking past each other. Let me try to clarify my position. You said:

“the assumption that consciousness (defined subjectively, not objectively) is a naturally emergent property of the known laws of physics and chemistry cannot be right.”

To which I ask, why not? That’s what you haven’t shown me yet. My view is consistent with what we all experience in daily life, so the burden is on you to show why what seems to be the case isn’t so.

You follow up your assertion that “subjectivity as a naturally emergent property can’t be right” with a statement about it being subjective, and hence not objective. While I agree that, by definition, “subjective” is not “objective” I don’t see why that implies that objective, measurable phenomena can’t _produce_ subjective epi-phenomemna.

Let’s try an other example or two. We can define and measure objectively frequencies of light that we call “colors.” A wavelength of so many nanometers we call “green” and some other number we call “red.” Those wavelengths are measurable quantities in objective reality.

However, the _perception_ of the color “red” is a subjective mental event.
“Redness” in this sense is not directly objectivly measurable. It is indirectly measurable by asking a sighted person “How red does that look to you?”

I claim that physics gives rise to chemsitry that gives rise to biology that gives rise to complex carbon structures in animals called “organs”. These very objective “organs” amongst other things perform the function of “senses” by translating such and so nanometer wavelenghts into the subjective experience of “green.” This subjective experience of green is represented by a very complex arrangement of firing neurons, embedded in some tissue, fed by nutrients etc..etc..etc… Essentially, I claim that subjective greeness is, objectively, a pattern in space and time of firing neurons. That constellation, that pattern, _is_ “subjective greeness”.

In theory, totally measurable and understandable.

What I’m saying is, subjective experience of “green” (and any subjective experience held by a brain) is apparently nothing more than a currently-poorly-understood complex manifestation of understandable, measurable, discrete, objective physical bits.

Change some chemicals arround inside my brain, or re-wire some neurons, or re-write my DNA to give me color-blindness, and suddenly subjective “green” goes away, even though objectively “green” wavelength light is still there. Reverse those physical changes, and *poof* subjective green is back. Seems like a pretty reliable, repeatable test that shows that subjective experience is a (poorly understood) consequence of the arrangements of many atoms and chemicals and structures.

For an other thought experiment, how about I go and ask one of your Zombies if they have subjective experiences? Is Zombie Jake a liar? He doesn’t need subjective experience to have memories and knowledge, and if in all other ways, his universe is the same as ours, he should be able to tell me that he has no internal subjective life. If you tell me that he has different memories or behavior/responses that will cause him to lie, we are back to my original claim that their universe is _not_ quark-identical with ours, and the bits you’ve removed or changed are , by definition, the bits that are theortically testable and measurable to be the ultimate cause of subjectivity. On the other hand, if he answers exactly as you do because his world is _exactly_ like ours, then you haven’t disproved my claim that the subjectivity is just naturally emergent from comprehensible, in theory, known physics.

Cheers.




Dear Anon:

Thank you for your comment! I live in China, and due to the recent earthquake in Taiwan, China was cut off from the rest of the world internet-wise, so I've been unable to even view my blog for a week.

This entire subject is, in my view, cutting-edge philosophy. There is a lively internet debate going on, and your comment has anticipated some of the views that are being expressed. I find this concept extremely challenging to conceptualize myself, but let me try to respond as best I can:

1. “the assumption that consciousness (defined subjectively, not objectively) is a naturally emergent property of the known laws of physics and chemistry cannot be right.”To which I ask, why not?"

Because the laws of physics and chemistry don't need subjective consciousness in order to provide a 100% complete and accurate description of the physical universe - so by logical extension, there is no particular reason to assert that subjective consciousness exists, any more than there is any particular reason to posit the existence of Thor the Flying Spaghetti Monster . But since subjective consciouness exists anyway (like some sort of free bonus), there must be something wrong with (or incomplete about) the reasoning which falsely states that it doesn't exist. Leading to my ultimate point that materialistic reasoning is incapable of fully describing the universe as we experience it.

The thinking seems to be "subjective consciousness exists, therefore it must be a product of physical processes". But this is an assumption disguised as a conclusion. No mechanism has even been proposed to the best of my knowledge. Sure, science can account for the functions of consciousness, but this is the "easy" problem of consciousness - what you end up with at the end of it all is a mere description of how a given organism will react to a given stimulus - but even a zombie can do that, so materialism remains unable to distinguish between a zombie and a subjectively conscious individual. I would argue that from a materialist point of view, the very existence of subjective consciousness is inexplicable, and that subjective consciousness is by its very essence something that the methods of science (based as they are on objectivity and empericism) are unequipped to study.

2. I would concede your second point (about colors and stuff), but I don't believe that it is fatal to my overall point. I cannot but agree that (at least apparently) physical processes necessarily affect the quality of our subjective perceptions - if I put my hand on a hot stove I'm going to be treated to the subjective experience of pain. But although an analysis of physical processes can successfully predict how my subjective consciousness is going to be affected by a given stimulus (and therefore, what type of subjective experience I will have) , it cannot explain why I have any subjective consciousness to be affected by stimuli in the first place. Zombie Jake, placing his hand on a hot stove, would cry out in pain but he wouldn't experience pain, any more than my mirror image would experience pain as it reflected my anguish.

3. Your third point is perhaps conceptually the most difficult. The crux of the difficulty seems to be:

If Zombie Jake answers "No, I am not subjectively conscious", then the two universes we are comparing would no be physically identical, and those physical differences, even if they are as insignificant as neural firing patterns in Zombie Jake's brain, could be used to provide a measurable physical basis for identifying and recognizing subjective consciousness.

But if Zombie Jake answers "Yes, I am subjectively conscious" - hey, I am telling the truth when I make that statement, but isn't Zombie Jake speaking falsely (although probably not lying, since he is not "aware" that his statement is false)? And if he is speaking falsely, isn't that a difference right there? I would say yes, it's a difference, but not an observable or measurable difference (and thus not a scientifically recognizable difference), because we are assuming that Zombie Jake is subjectively unconscious rather than establishing his unconsciousness on the basis of physical evidence.

But I think that up to now I have still been skating over the surface of the problem. Would Zombie Jake really be speaking falsely if he affirmed that he was subjectively conscious? Would his statement "I am subjectively conscious" be (i) a true statement, (ii) a false statement, or (iii) a statement with no truth value at all?

I have thought about this very question for years, and at this point I am inclined to answer (iii) - the statement would have no truth value at all, because the term "subjective consciousness" can have no meaning in "Zombieland" - but neither would the question, and neither would any other statement or question that could possibly be uttered in Zombieland have any meaning - rather all "meaning" resides in the minds of subjectively conscious beings. Thus it is we, the subjectively conscious "observers" of this imaginary universe who imbue that question, and its answer, with meaning. Thus Zombieland has no truths and no falsehoods until observed (or imagined) by us (whoa, am I getting into quantum physics here? I'm not sure...). And no statement uttered by Zombie Jake could possibly be either "true" or "false" except by reference to an imaginary universe (which would be our universe, from Zombie Jake's point of view)

Another way of describing the same idea: the statement "I am subjectively conscious", uttered by a parakeet mimicking what it heard, would be true from our point of view, but meaningless from the bird's point of view because it was not utttered as a statement but only as a mimicry of what it heard. I can look in the mirror, state "I am subjectively conscious", watch my mirror image utter the same words, and still have no basis for accusing my mirror image of lying (conversely, if I stood in front to the mirror and stated "I am not subjectively conscious, I would have no basis for praising my mirror image for its honesty).

This discussion is taking place at very near upper limit that my meager intellect is capable of, and right now my brain is starting to liquefy and dribble out of my ears...so I might be turning into a zombie soon...make sure to ask me if I'm conscious and see what I say... (-:

By the way, David Chalmers, the philosopher who's probably thought about this problem more than anyone else, maintains (if I understand him correctly) that subjectively consciousness is not derived from physical processes but nevertheless is a natural rather than supernatural phenomenon - he argues that "qualia" (as he calls it) is a natural phenomenon that is just as basic as space, time, and the laws of physics.